Adaptive detection evasion techniques for terrorism-related information gathering on the surface and dark web by Iliou, Christos
  -i- 
 
Adaptive detection evasion 
techniques for terrorism-
related information gathering 
on the surface and dark web 
 
Iliou Christos 
SID: 3307150004 
 
 
SCHOOL OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 
A thesis submitted for the degree of  
Master of Science (MSc) in Communications and Cybersecurity 
 
 
OCTOBER 2016 
THESSALONIKI – GREECE 
-ii- 
 
Adaptive detection evasion 
techniques for terrorism-
related information gathering 
on the surface and dark web 
 
Iliou Christos 
SID: 3307150004 
 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. N. Bassiliades  
Supervising Committee Mem-
bers: 
Dr. Y. Kompatsiaris 
Dr. D. Baltatzis 
 
SCHOOL OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 
A thesis submitted for the degree of  
Master of Science (MSc) in Communications and Cybersecurity 
OCTOBER 2016 
THESSALONIKI – GREECE 
  -iii- 
 
Abstract 
Terrorists have introduced several new challenges for Law Enforcement Agencies 
(LEAs), including their extensive use of the Web for communication and diffusion of 
their knowledge, with particular emphasis on the Dark Web due to the anonymity it 
provides. Thus, it is necessary for LEAs to be able to discover and collect this terrorism-
related content both on the Surface and the Dark Web. An important challenge is the 
fact that servers hosting such content may identify and block bots that attempt to access 
it. This work proposes a novel botnet framework for the discovery and collection of 
content relevant to a domain of interest on both the Surface and the Dark Web (in par-
ticular its Tor, the I2P and the Freenet darknets) that adopts a humanlike browsing be-
haviour so as evade detection of its bot nature. We evaluated the botnet in the context of 
accessing terrorism-related content. The evaluation experiments indicate the effective-
ness of the proposed approach regarding the collection of terrorism-related content and 
also its efficacy in mimicking human browsing behaviour regarding the number of hy-
perlinks that are followed and the time interval between requests. 
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1 Introduction 
The terrorist attacks in recent years have unveiled how modern technology is being used 
for the communication and diffusion of knowledge among terrorists. Terrorists are 
nowadays familiar with the Internet and its potential, and use it for organising their net-
works and even for coordinating their attacks. Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) thus 
need effective and efficient tools for discovering and gathering terrorism-related content 
on the Web with the goal to mitigate terrorist attacks through the analysis and mining of 
such content that could lead to the identification of the members and structure of terror-
ism organisations, the explosives they use and the way these explosives are constructed, 
and even their next planned attacks. 
This is, though, a challenging task since the ease of Internet access, the lack of regula-
tion, and the fast flow of information enable terrorist groups to communicate effortless-
ly towards achieving their goals. Apart from their large volume, Web data, and in par-
ticular terrorism-related resources, are highly volatile, being accessible for some time 
and then disappearing, making it even more difficult for such resources to be located 
and gathered. Moreover, new anonymisation technologies have further facilitated terror-
ists to stealthily access online content both on the Surface and the Dark Web, since they 
allow the identity of such users to be indiscernible from that of legitimate users. In addi-
tion, Dark Web servers use anonymisation techniques that mask their IPs and physical 
location, making them the ideal place to store illicit content, including terrorism-related 
material. Finally, the increase of the terrorists’ technological knowledge has enabled 
them to deploy technologies that identify and block bots (crawlers) that try to automati-
cally collect and parse content from their online servers, which makes it even more dif-
ficult for LEAs to discover and gather such content. 
Therefore, there is a need for tools that automatically discover and gather terrorism-
related content on the Web, including both the Surface and the Dark Web, while also 
avoiding the aforementioned protection mechanisms. Already established projects, like 
The Dark Web project1 of the University of Arizona and the FP7 SEC HOMER2 project 
                                                 
1 https://ai.arizona.edu/research/dark-web-geo-web. In this case, the Dark Web is considered part of the 
Web that contains content related to the terrorism, extremism, etc. and not the Dark Web that consists of 
darknets (like the TOR, I2P and Freenet) that is described in this thesis. 
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and newly started ones, like the H2020 SEC TENSOR 2015 project confirm the need of 
effective and efficient tools for this purpose. These projects include a common objective 
dealing with the research and development of classifier-guided tools that traverse the 
Web for the identification and collection of content related to terrorism in general [1] 
and to homemade explosives in particular [2]. The Dark Web project focused on crawl-
ers that discover and gather extremist content on forums, rather than the general Web, 
with particular emphasis in developing authentication techniques so as to bypass some 
of the protection mechanisms applied in accessing them [3]. The HOMER project fo-
cused on the discovery and gathering of such content and in particular of information 
related to homemade explosive recipes by introducing  hybrid crawlers capable of trav-
ersing both the Surface and the most popular darknets of the Dark Web (i.e. the Tor3, 
the I2P4 and the Freenet5), exploiting the existing interconnectivity between these net-
works [4]. The empirical study conducted in the context of the HOMER project identi-
fied that many servers containing such content employ protection mechanisms which 
block users exhibiting unusual behaviour (e.g. following hyperlinks based on their order 
within the content of a Web page or issuing a large number of concurrent successive 
requests). State-of-the-art methodologies [2], [4] may fail in bypassing the protection 
mechanisms applied, since they are mostly based on static approaches for discovering 
relevant content (e.g. use of pre-trained classifiers, application of the breadth-first 
crawling strategy, issue of requests in predetermined constant time intervals, etc.).  
At the same time, when engaged in online conversations on Web forums and discussion 
groups, the terrorists usually employ a slang which includes codewords (i.e. common 
everyday words or phrases) for replacing words or phrases conveying terrorist-related 
information (i.e. the may use the codeword wedding when referring to a terrorist attack, 
or the codeword tourist when referring to a new recruit), with the goal to prevent eaves-
droppers and particularly law enforcement and intelligence agents monitoring these 
conversations from comprehending their real content. The codewords used frequently 
change, so as to make it more difficult for the LEAs to monitor the conversations over 
                                                                                                                                               
2 http://www.homer-project.eu/. HOmeMade Explosives and Recipes characterization FP7 EU project 
3 https://www.torproject.org/ 
4 https://geti2p.net/en/ 
5 https://freenetproject.org/ 
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time; hence, the tools employed for discovering and gathering terrorism-related infor-
mation should be equipped with a mechanism capable of detecting content and conver-
sations including not only explicit terrorism-related terms, but also the codewords used 
within this context, and adapt over time so as to incorporate the changes applied in the 
codewords lexicon.  
To this end, this work proposes a botnet, representing a network consisting of machines 
(known as bots or zombies) that automate a process adopting a humanlike behaviour, 
for gathering content related to a specific domain of interest both from the Surface Web 
and several darknets of the Dark Web. These bots are trained to collect terrorism-related 
content and are also capable of utilizing codewords that LEAs have identified as cur-
rently being used within the terrorist conversations. Each bot exhibits a dynamic behav-
iour following a different browsing pattern which mimics humanlike behaviour, making 
it very difficult for a server to distinguish it from a real user.  
The main contribution of our work is the use of a botnet framework, consisting of bots 
that mimic human behaviour, for the evasive (i.e. without being identified as a botnet) 
collection of domain-specific content, both from the Surface and the Dark Web. The 
remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents the literature review. 
Chapter 3 analyses our methodology, whereas Chapter 4 examines the legal framework 
of our proposed approach.  Next, Chapter 5 describes the results of our experiments for 
evaluating the effectiveness of our approach. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses our conclu-
sions and the potential future improvements. 
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2 Literature Review 
Our proposed framework uses a botnet able to traverse the Surface and the Dark Web 
for gathering content related to a specific domain of interest by using bots demonstrat-
ing a humanlike behaviour. To this end, this chapter first describes the state-of-the-art 
botnet architectures and communication protocols and how our approach is differentiat-
ed from them. Next, it discusses the state-of-the-art botnet detection techniques and ana-
lyse how they can be evaded by following our approach. Then, it presents the latest re-
search efforts in the field of focused crawlers and provides a comparison with the meth-
odologies our framework has proposed. Finally, it describes the state-of-the-art method-
ologies related to the human browsing modelling and discusses how our framework can 
exploit and enhance them in order to provide a more evasive approach for discovering 
and gathering the content of interest. 
 
2.1 Botnets 
A botnet (formed by the words robot and network) is an interconnected network of ma-
chines, called bots or zombies. Botnets are often used for malicious purposes; their bots 
are machines infected with malware which allows their remote control without the 
knowledge of their owner [5]. In our case, we assume that the botnet software is will-
ingly installed by users and thus no malware or other illegal actions need to be per-
formed for the distribution of out botnet. Generally, botnet technologies, architectures 
and communication protocols vary depending on what the Botmaster (i.e. the creator 
and/or the controller of the botnet) wants to achieve. This chapter discusses some of the 
most commonly used Botnet technologies applied by well-known Botnets. 
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2.1.1 Botnet Architectures 
The Botnet architecture, like any other network architecture, varies depending on the 
purpose of the botnet. The most common architectures are (i) the Client-Server, (ii) the 
Peer-to-Peer and (iii) the Hybrid architecture [6]. 
 
Client – Server architecture 
In the client-server architecture, one or more servers called Command and Control 
(C&C) servers issue the commands to the bots and receive their responses. These C&C 
servers are controlled by the Botmaster(s). The Botmasters do not communicate directly 
with the bots (unless they want to); all the commands destined for the bots go through 
the C&C servers.  
When a bot is installed on a machine, it first communicates back with the C&C server, 
informing it of its existence. Next, the C&C server may issue a command to the bot. In 
order for the Botmaster to initiate a process using the botnet, they have to connect to the 
available C&C servers and issue the respective commands. 
The client-server (centralized) architecture is easily established and used. The infected 
bots need only to connect back to their C&C server. Next, they are capable of listening 
to commands issued from this server. 
 
Bot 1 Bot 2 ... Bot N
C&C
server
 
Figure 1: Client-server botnet architecture 
 
The core disadvantage of this architecture is the ease of protecting against the botnet 
and eventually taking it down [7], [8]. A bot connects to a specific C&C server, hence it 
reveals its IP address. Therefore, someone may take over the botnet by locating and 
controlling the C&C servers. The Botmasters may use proxies between C&C servers 
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and bots, in an effort to establish a more evasive infrastructure. This way the process of 
locating the real C&C servers, though still feasible, becomes more difficult. Further-
more, state-of-the-art approaches introduce the use of the Dark Web in combination 
with the botnet architecture so that the bots contained in the C&C servers use the anon-
ymisation veil of the Dark Web, which in turn results in hiding their real IP address. 
Section 2.3.1 describes in detail the application of the botnet architecture in Dark Web. 
 
Peer-to-Peer architecture 
In the peer-to-peer (P2P) architecture, botnets take advantage of the decentralized P2P 
model in order to avoid providing a “single point of failure”, as opposed to the central-
ized approach. In this case, the bots start operating exploiting a list of other already ex-
isting P2P bots. This initial network may be manually established by infecting specific 
machines. Each new bot publishes itself to the network making other bots aware of its 
existence. It connects to a small number of bots, so as to conform to the existing scala-
bility constraints and to avoid facilitating the mapping of the whole network.  
 
Bot
Bot
Bot
Bot
Bot
Bot
BotBot
 
Figure 2: P2P botnet architecture 
 
Due to the fact that Botmasters have no direct control over the bots, each issued com-
mand must be propagated through the network. When a bot receives a message, it is 
passed to its neighbours. Thus, monitoring a single bot or a small number of bots will 
only reveal a small subset of the botnet and not the whole network. 
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The P2P architecture has become the dominant approach in terms of robustness [9]. The 
decentralized architecture of a P2P botnet protects it against efforts of locating the Bot-
masters and taking the network down. However, there is a trade-off among the robust-
ness and the whole network’s efficiency. First, the P2P botnets are more difficult to be 
established, because they need mechanisms to auto coordinate their actions. In the cen-
tralized approach, the bots are only required to connect back to the C&C server and wait 
for the commands to be issued. On the other hand, in the P2P architecture, several algo-
rithms should be applied for enabling a bot to decide whether to maintain its connec-
tions, how to find the most efficient way to transmit a command to all bots, and how to 
avoid broadcasting storms. Especially in cases when the punctuality of the issued com-
mands is needed, the P2P architecture may fail. The fact that the commands should be 
propagated through the network adds some latency to the issued command. For exam-
ple, if the Botmaster wants to start a DDoS attack, the concurrent initiation of several 
bots requires either a timestamp provided by the Botmaster, or the application of a syn-
chronization algorithm such as the “fire squad algorithm” [10]. Therefore, selecting the 
botnet architecture entails a compromise among the network’s efficiency and the ro-
bustness. 
 
Hybrid architecture 
Both the centralized and the decentralized botnet architectures experience issues either 
with their vulnerability to attacks or with their inefficiency. To this end, a hybrid archi-
tecture exploiting the advantages of both the client-server and the P2P architectures is 
applied. 
Instead of having a C&C server or a small number of C&C servers directly communi-
cating to bots, the hybrid approach employs a P2P sub-network of C&C. This sub-
network is very similar to the P2P botnet described, however it only includes C&C 
servers. When a machine joins the botnet, it sends a request for connection to a C&C 
server through the P2P network. Under the hybrid approach neither the bots nor the 
C&C servers are aware of the whole network infrastructure, but only of a small part of 
it. This in turn provides a higher level of robustness and lower latency as compared to 
the P2P architecture, since the commands do not propagate through the whole network. 
An implementation and evaluation of a hybrid botnet is discussed by Wang [11]. The 
botnet examined includes two classes of bots, the ones connected with a static, non-
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private IP address, accessible from the global Internet (known as servant bots) and the 
ones connected using a dynamic or private IP address operating behind a firewall which 
cannot be accessed through the global Internet (known as client bots). The servant bots 
are the only candidates in peer lists. All bots, both the client and the servant bots active-
ly contact the servant bots in their peer lists to retrieve commands. 
 
Servant 
Bot
Servant 
Bot
Servant 
Bot
Servant 
Bot
Servant 
Bot Servant 
Bot
Client 
Bot
Client 
Bot
Client 
Bot  
Figure 3: Botnet hybrid architecture 
 
The well-known Zeusbot/Spyeye implementation [12] proposes an alternative hybrid 
approach, where the client-server C&C architecture is mainly applied; however, a back-
up P2P connection is also available so as to be used when the server cannot be reached. 
In this case, each bot may be used as a server by using nGinx, a light-weight server, and 
a communication protocol such as HTTP (see Section 2.1.2). 
The hybrid approach exploits the advantages of both the client-server and the P2P archi-
tecture, without experiencing their core drawbacks. In the writer’s opinion this will be 
the dominant architecture in constructing scalable, robustness and efficient botnets. 
However, in order to create such botnets a lot of effort must be made compared to the 
effort needed for the other architectures. Again, the choice of the architecture strongly 
depends on what the Botmaster wants to achieve. 
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Taking the above into consideration, we decided to use the client-server architecture due 
to the fact that (i) it is the simplest one and (ii) it fulfils our requirements, which are the 
efficient communication between the C&C server and the bots since it introduces the 
minimum overhead. The P2P and the hybrid approach both require communication be-
tween bots and distribution of commands from one bot to another. The establishment of 
connections between bots would result in a more complicated architecture with many 
ongoing connections and more overhead for the transmission of information. 
 
2.1.2 Botnet Communication protocols 
The botnets employ two types of communication: (i) the internal communication which 
is established between bots, or bots and C&C servers and (ii) the external communica-
tion which is established among bots and other Internet machines. In the latter, the pro-
tocols used are the standard ones and cannot be changed over time. In the former, the 
protocols used depend on the architecture and their core objective is to hide the exist-
ence of botnet traffic within the network and provide an efficient way for the communi-
cation among bots. 
The first centralized botnets used the IRC protocol to communicate with each other [13] 
due to its prominence during the early days of the Internet. Nowadays, bots use either 
the HTTP protocol or the HTTPs protocol which provides an additional encryption lay-
er over the communication channel [14]. Another novel approach is to use the ICMP 
protocol instead of the IRC one for the communication between bots [14]. Finally, for 
the decentralised botnets, practically any already existing P2P protocol can be applied, 
such as the ones used for file sharing like the BitTorrent, or the Botnet creator could in-
troduce their own. 
In our approach, the bot’s software will be knowingly installed on users’ machines. 
Thus, there is no need to use one of the state-of-the-art inter-botnet communication pro-
tocols. To this end, we propose a custom pseudo-communication protocol on top of the 
TCP that fulfils the requirements of our framework with as little overhead as possible. 
This protocol is described in detail in Section 3.2.2. 
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2.1.3 Botnets and the Dark Web 
Over the last years, the World Wide Web (WWW) constitutes the most popular tech-
nology, as it is used by billions of users. Contrary to what the average user may believe, 
only a small part of the Web is easily accessible. Part of the WWW needs some further 
action from the user in order to be accessed and some part of the WWW needs specific 
software to be accessed. The part of the Web which is readily accessible, for the access 
of whom no further action is needed from the user except the visit of the respective 
URL, is called Surface Web. Surface Web can be indexed by conventional search en-
gines without any special techniques. On the other hand, there is some part of the World 
Wide Web which needs specific action from the user to be accessed. These actions in-
clude the submission of a query, the response to a question or an authentication process. 
This part of the WWW is called Deep Web. Finally, there is a part of the World Wide 
Web that (i) needs specific software to be accessed6 and (ii) that provides some sort of 
anonymity to its users, which is called the Dark Web. Since the Dark Web needs specif-
ic software to be accessed, it can be considered as part of the Deep Web. Of course, 
when the specific software is used, the Dark Web also can be split into two parts, the 
one that is accessible without any further user action and the one that needs specific ac-
tions from the user. 
 
                                                 
6 This is not accurate, since there are some services, like the Tor2Web (https://www.tor2web.org/), which 
allows users to access Dark Web content (here content from the TOR network) without forcing users to 
any further software except from their browser. Of course these services do use specific software in order 
to have access to this content. 
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Figure 4: Surface vs Deep vs Dark Web 
 
The Dark Web includes several darknets (i.e. networks inside the Internet that provide 
users with anonymity). Darknets are overlay networks that need special software to be 
accessed and use non-standard communication protocols. The most popular darknets of 
the Dark Web are the Tor, the I2P and the Freenet. 
The Onion Router – TOR: Tor is the most popular darknet because of its ease of use and 
at the same time the enhanced privacy and security that it provides. This is partly due to 
the fact that the Tor community is a big one and partly because of its great funding7. Tor 
network is structured in such a way that in order to visit a server a Tor user does not 
connect directly to it, but it creates a virtual circuit consisting of many nodes and the 
message is encrypted once for every node in the network. Thus, each node decrypts a 
layer of encryption which results in the revelation of the next nodes address and an en-
crypted message which has been encrypted with next node’s key. This protects the 
sender’s identity since each node can only get the addresses of the previous and the next 
node. 
Invisible Internet Protocol - I2P: The I2P, like the TOR, is an overlay network (i.e. a 
network within a network) that allows users to communicate pseudonymously and se-
curely over the Internet. The services that it provides are, among others, Web browsing, 
file sharing, email, chat, blog, distributed data store and newsgroups. 
                                                 
7 https://www.torproject.org/about/sponsors.html.en 
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Freenet: Freenet is a peer-to-peer network that is known for its decentralized file-
sharing service. Each Freenet node provides part of its hardware storage and processing 
power in order to contribute to the network by locally storing and distributing, when 
needed, this content. Each Freenet file can be accessed by using a unique URL which is 
called a Freenet Key. 
As discussed above, the centralized botnets’ main disadvantage is related to the com-
munication between bots and C&C servers, which under certain circumstances can re-
sult in the botnet take-down. This can be avoided by establishing the server in the Dark 
Web. Darknets not only provide anonymity to the users, but they also allow the obfus-
cation of the location of servers that exist inside them. Hence, state-of-the-art approach-
es use the Dark Web for the protection of the C&C server’s IP address and thus its 
physical location [15]. 
The architecture supporting this functionality is illustrated in Figure 5. Each C&C serv-
er is located in the TOR network. When a bot wants to communicate with the C&C 
server, it visits its URL site, which, in turn, does not correspond to the real C&C server, 
but to some other TOR nodes that, due to the TOR network architecture, are really diffi-
cult to be correlated with the real server. 
 
 
Figure 5: Botnet combined with TOR network 
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One problem that might occur is related to the fact that a bot utilizing the Tor network 
needs to operate on a machine where the TOR service is installed. However, the botnet 
software must operate in a stealthy fashion without triggering any alerts, and, hence, the 
installation of the TOR service along with the bot is impractical [8]. 
A solution to this problem may be the use of special services, such as the ones provided 
by the Tor2Web8 server [7], which can be used to access a server located inside the 
TOR network without using the Tor software. However, this solution is also susceptible 
to attacks [7], since Tor2Web traffic can be filtered and the logging system of Tor2Web 
proxy is unknown. 
In our approach, we also take advantage of the anonymization veil that the Dark Web 
provides, but instead of protecting our C&C server (which legally exists), we use them 
in order to provide pseudonymity to our bots in order to make it difficult for the servers 
of interest to locate the real location of our bots. 
 
2.1.4 Botnet Detection Techniques 
The botnet phenomenon has been extensively researched both by the industry and the 
academia the past years. Even though many attempts have been conducted to develop 
sufficient protection mechanisms against the botnets, new botnet techniques capable of 
bypassing the existing security mechanisms are developed. State-of-the-art botnet detec-
tion techniques include the Honeypots, the Signature-based Intrusion Detection and the 
Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection [6]. 
 
Honeypots 
The honeypots are machines or devices without any production value for a company or 
institution, which seem to contain information of value for an attacker; however they 
operate as a trap for alluring malicious users and block them. A legitimate user will not 
interact with these machines; thus, the interaction with a honeypot is considered as sus-
picious activity. This entails that several security measures should be applied to the in-
teracting agent and a forensics analysis should take place to study the event.  
                                                 
8 https://tor2web.org/  
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In our case, hidden hyperlinks of a Web page which normally are not followed by a 
human user may act as honeypots for bots. For example, a non-visible hyperlink (e.g. a 
hyperlink with the same font colour as the background of a Web page) will not be fol-
lowed by a human user, but only by an automated tool capable of parsing the html code 
of a given Web page. Since these hyperlinks are formed in such a way so as to attract 
bots (i.e. are easily accessible and parsed), it is really difficult for bots to identify them.  
 
Signature-based Intrusion Detection 
Signature-based detection mechanisms can identify a specific predefined behaviour that 
was marked as potentially dangerous. For example, specific actions that only a bot can 
perform, such as an HTTP request without an agent name, may be considered suspi-
cious. The signature-based detection mechanisms may be easily bypassed when a bot’s 
browsing pattern resembles human behaviour. Since the signature and characteristics of 
browsers used by human can be easily duplicated, the bots can sufficiently bypass this 
kind of defence by spoofing the respective identities.  
 
Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection 
The anomaly-based detection methods compare the activity considered normal against 
the observed one. In this case, machine learning techniques are used to train the system 
so as to identify potential non-human activity. Usually, this method is able to effectively 
detect a botnet behaviour, since the system identifies changes in the normal behaviour 
of the network. When the changes of some measured features are greater than expected, 
an alert is created. Given that the methods used by advanced threats in general are far 
beyond the conventional attack vectors, signature-based defensive mechanisms usually 
fail. On the other hand, anomaly-based intrusion detection with strict rules may result in 
a lot of false positive alerts.  
 
Hybrid approach 
State-of-the-art techniques combine the signatures of the already known malicious be-
haviours with anomaly detection mechanisms in order to provide a more holistic detec-
tion view. These systems are known as Hybrid IDS (HIDS) [16]. 
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The aforementioned botnet detection techniques are based mainly on two inherent bot-
net characteristics, the non-human behaviour of botnets and the similarity of the behav-
iour of bots belonging to the same botnet. On the contrary, our approach proposes a 
botnet where each bot mimics humanlike behaviour and presents a different approach 
depending on the Web pages it is applied to. 
 
2.2 Web Crawling 
Web crawlers (also known as spiders or robots) are software programs that traverse the 
Web in an automated manner for discovering Web resources. They are most commonly 
used by search engines in order to gather and index the Web content so that it can be 
accessible through searches. There are mainly two categories of crawlers, the general-
purpose crawlers and the focused crawlers. 
 
2.2.1 General-purpose crawlers 
A general-purpose crawler is usually employed by popular search engines, such as 
Google and Yahoo!. Its main purpose is to gather content on the Web by traversing its 
link structure. In principal, a general-purpose crawler starts from an initial set of URLs 
called seed set. These URLs are added to a URL repository, which is called frontier. 
The Web crawler retrieves a URL from the frontier, downloads its content (fetches the 
page) and parses it in order to extract the hyperlinks contained. All the extracted hyper-
links (removing duplicate or previously downloaded URLs) are added to the frontier. 
The process is repeated until new URLs can be added to the frontier. 
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Figure 6: Web Crawler 
 
2.2.2 Focused Crawlers 
A focused (or topical) crawler enables the automatic discovery of Web resources related 
to a given topic by exploiting the structure of the Web. In order to do that, focused 
crawlers use features in the vicinity of the hyperlinks in the parent page in order to de-
cide whether or not to follow these hyperlinks depending on the relevance to the top-
ic/domain of interest [2], [17]. Thus, the focused crawler, like the general-purpose 
crawler, downloads each URL contained in the frontier, parses them and extracts all the 
relevant hyperlinks accompanied with some textual features, like anchor text, terms that 
can be extracted from the URL and the surrounding text [17]. All these features are used 
as input to the classifier. The classifier outputs a score depending on the relevance of 
these textual features to the domain of interest. If the score is greater that the threshold, 
the hyperlink is accepted, otherwise it is rejected.  
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Figure 7: Focused Crawler 
 
In order to decide whether to follow a hyperlink, state-of-the-art approaches in focused 
crawling propose the use of textual [17] and/or multimedia [2] features in the vicinity of 
the hyperlinks in the parent page so as better estimate whether these hyperlinks are rele-
vant to the domain of interest [17], [2]. These textual features can be used as input to 
classifiers trained in a specific domain of interest. Later approaches have identified that 
sometimes there is a lack of textual evidence in the vicinity of hyperlinks and the classi-
fiers might fail to identify these hyperlinks [4]. To this end, they propose a hybrid ap-
proach in which, if the score is neither too high nor too low, the questioned hyperlink is 
downloaded and re-evaluated by a classifier that takes as input the whole Web page. All 
these approaches [2], [4] propose the Support Vector Machines for textual classifica-
tion.  
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are models that can be used in order to classify data 
as positive or negative for a domain of interest depending on some of their characteris-
tics, like the frequency of appearance of some specific words in a Web page. In order to 
do that, SVMs must be trained by using some input data that are annotated as positive or 
negative. Besides that, the features (observable measurable properties) that will be used 
must be decided. State-of-the-art approaches [2], [4] decide on the features by using a 
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huge amount of training data and by extracting the frequency of the appearance of each 
word (after removing some neutral words called stopwords like articles, names, com-
mon words, etc). Basically, each training document (document that is annotated as posi-
tive or negative) is represented as a vector of some features, each one having a score. 
Then the algorithm decides the optimal hyperplane for better separating the training da-
ta between the positives and the negatives.  
 
 
 
Figure 8: SVM example 
 
After that, the values of the features of every new sample will be calculated and its loca-
tion regarding the hyperline will be determined. If it is on the positive side, it will be 
assigned as positive, otherwise it will be assigned as negative. 
 
2.3 Human browsing behaviour modelling 
The question whether machines are able to exhibit humanlike behaviour has been a sub-
ject of discussion throughout the past years. The most prominent test for defining if a 
machine exhibits intelligent behaviour is the Turing test developed by Alan Turing in 
1950. A human evaluator engages in natural language conversations with a black box 
representing either a human or a machine capable of generating humanlike responses 
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using a text-only channel. If the evaluator cannot reliably decide whether they com-
municate with a machine or a human, then the machine is said to have passed the test. 
 
2.3.1 Modelling of human behaviour in Web Browsing 
The need of adequate human behaviour modelling is vital for many research areas, in-
cluding the field of Web Browsing, where a bot must apply humanlike behaviour when 
traversing the Web. The two most prominent approaches developed for the human 
browsing modelling include the use of machine learning techniques [18], [19], [20], 
[21], [22] and the use of probability distributions that follow the human browsing be-
haviour [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28]. 
Machine learning techniques are widely applied in modelling human browsing behav-
iour. Review surveys have shown the importance and application of soft computing 
techniques (i.e. fuzzy logic, neural networks, genetic algorithms, fuzzy clustering and 
neuro-fuzzy systems) in human browsing modelling [18]. Later studies further exploited 
the current machine learning techniques by introducing new variations, such as the H-
UNC unsupervised machine learning algorithm [29]. The H-UNC algorithm initially 
receives Web log data as input, then it pre-processes and enriches the data by taking ad-
vantage of external resources and finally it outputs the user profiles. Later studies have 
also combined the history data exported from users who were interacting with test web-
servers for profiling individual users or user groups [19], [20], [21]. Kosir et al. [19] 
have exploited historical data related to a user’s behaviour when visiting websites, so as 
to generate the user profiles; the profiles are constantly re-adapted to new changes by 
applying a time-decay function to the already extracted features. Fetter et al. [20] have 
proposed a framework using data streams from network probes for predicting the future 
user actions. This framework extracts the feature values from these data and provides 
them as input to an active learning algorithm in order to derive the user preferences. 
This process is constantly repeated resulting in adapting the extracted concepts to user 
behaviour changes. Wei et al. [21] have also proposed a non-parametric hidden Markov 
model for user profile analysis. Based on that model, they have further developed a 
model-based cluster algorithm generating finite groups of users sharing similar activity 
patterns. Finally, several tools that enable user model designers to easily construct user 
and group models have been developed [22].  
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Regarding the probability distributions, early research efforts have proposed the power-
law distribution for modelling the human browsing behaviour based on the number of 
hyperlinks that a user follows [23]. This distribution has been derived by studying Web 
surfing within an economics context. Specifically, a given Web page has a value which 
is inherited to all child pages linked with it. Each Web page click is considered to have 
some cost, and the users should keep following hyperlinks until the sum of the cost be-
comes greater that the initial value. The distribution derived is known as Zipf’s Law, 
and several later research efforts have confirmed its validity for modelling human 
browsing behaviour [24], [25], [26], [27], [28]. Levene et al. [24] have concluded to a 
Zipf’s like distribution for human browsing behaviour by using an absorbing Markov 
Model chain in order to model surfer behaviour by assuming that less probable naviga-
tion trailers are, on average, longer than more probable ones. Furthermore, the human-
like behaviour of bots following the Zipf’s law has resulted in using it for DDoS attack 
tools [26]. A Web server is usually incapable of detecting and blocking a number of 
bots sending requests which mimic human browsing behaviour. However, if the number 
of bots following Zipf-like distributions exceeds the threshold of the potential legitimate 
active users, then the bots can be distinguished from humans [27]. A recent research 
[28] confirms that Zipf-like distributions may be used by bots in order to mimic human 
behaviour which can also be used for DDoS attacks. At the same time, it is worth men-
tioning that another major characteristic of human browsing behaviour is related to the 
time elapsing between submitting successive requests to a Web server. Several research 
studies [26], [27] have shown that the request time interval follows the Pareto distribu-
tion. A later study [30] identified that inter-event times of microblog posting and wiki 
revisiting follow the double Pareto distribution as well. 
Our proposed approach is based on the state-of-the-art distributions encountered in the 
literature. Following recent research, our framework uses a Zipf-like distribution [26], 
[27], [28] on deciding the number of hyperlinks to follow, but instead of randomly se-
lecting the hyperlinks (which also reveals bot behaviour) our application follows the 
hyperlinks which are relevant to a domain of interest, and particularly the terrorism do-
main. At the same time, for submitting requests to a Web server, our framework follows 
the double Pareto distribution [30] enhanced to take into consideration the size of the 
page with a probability of whether the user/bot has followed it. 
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2.3.2 Bot Detection by using modelling of human behaviour 
The Anomaly Detection is one of the most efficient techniques for detecting botnets. It 
is based on machine learning techniques that compare the normal behaviour of benign 
agents (e.g. users browsing a Web site) with the behaviour of newcoming users that 
might be malicious. If the behaviour of new agents does not follow the normal browsing 
behaviour, it is marked as suspicious and further actions are applied. When the systems 
of interest contain interfaces that the user directly interacts with, such as the Web 
browsers, anomaly detection can be applied through modelling/emulating human behav-
iour. The premise of anomaly detection through modelling human behaviour is that, if a 
detection machine knows the basic human behaviour (i.e. baseline behaviour) and iden-
tifies a lot of changes compared to it, then it creates alerts informing the system admin-
istrators about this abnormal activity and even acts proactively, by blocking these ac-
tions.  
Many approaches have been proposed for anomaly detection depending on human mod-
elling [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38]. Guofei et al. [31] have proposed a 
general botnet detection framework that is independent of the botnet protocol and struc-
ture, and requires no a priori knowledge of the botnet architecture. Assuming that bots 
belonging to the same botnet share a similar behaviour, they can be distinguished from 
real users. Thus, clustering methodologies and pattern vectors have been implemented 
in order to separate real users from bots. Furthermore, Oikonomou et al. [32] have ex-
ploited three main aspects of human browsing behaviour: (i) the request dynamics, (ii) 
the request semantics and (iii) the ability to process visual cues and proposed defences 
against DDoS attacks conducted by botnets flooding victim servers with a lot of re-
quests. Chai et al. [33] have discussed the structure model, the function modules, the 
work flow and the functional characteristics of intelligent intrusion detection systems 
based on a Web Data Mining technology. They have concluded that an intelligent intru-
sion detection system should include (i) a Data acquisition agent that collects network 
traffic, (ii) a Data pre-processing agent that performs tasks such as data cleaning and 
noise reduction and (iii) a Web data mining agent capable of analysing data by using 
clustering to extract certain features. Moreover, Wang et al. [34] have developed a de-
tection approach that groups “similar” user clickstreams into behavioural clusters, by 
partitioning a similarity graph that captures distances between clickstream sequences. 
Ting et al. [35] have proposed a novel Web usage mining approach so as to discover 
patterns in the navigation of websites, known as Unexpected Browsing Behaviours 
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(UBB). In this case, a set of predefined expected routes is provided by the administra-
tors of the Web servers and any route deviating from these routes is considered abnor-
mal. Respa et al. [36] have used the Hierarchical Particle Swarm Optimization (HPSO) 
method in order to detect requests from bots among genuine user requests. They suggest 
that bots exhibit outlier behaviour which is distant from the rest of the data. They also 
introduce a method which is based on the Maximum Flow Minimum Cut theorem from 
graph theory. The framework comprises a clustering and an outlier detection module.  
Furthermore, Neelima et al. [39] have proposed a method for extracting user behaviour 
from log files, by applying Web usage mining. The steps followed include (i) cleaning 
log data, (ii) User identification and (iii) Session identification. The user behaviour can 
be analysed, based on information about the user session (e.g. about the time spent on a 
particular page). Finally, Alphy et al. [38] have presented techniques in pattern discov-
ery and analysis in the Web usage mining from 1996 to 2015. Their goal is to identify 
the most used data from the Web. The Web usage mining process followed includes (i) 
Pre-processing (data cleansing, user identification and user session), (ii) Pattern discov-
ery (statistical analysis, association rules, clustering, classification, sequential pattern, 
dependency modelling, etc.) and (iii) Pattern analysis (using a knowledge query mecha-
nism or visualisation techniques).  
All the above approaches have one basic disadvantage related to the assumption that the 
bots (i) will exhibit similar behaviour with other bots and (ii) will exhibit different be-
haviour compared to normal users. Our approach exploits the human browsing charac-
teristics in order to adjust the bot behaviour so as to be indistinguishable from humans. 
Thus, we believe that, since state-of-the-art approaches are based on the aforementioned 
assumptions, by enhancing bots with humanlike behaviour we will be able to evasively 
collect Web content from servers that block bots. 
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3 Methodology 
This Chapter first defines our problem by introducing its main variables used through 
our methodology. Next, the basic architecture and communication protocol of our 
framework are presented. Following, the part of the botnet responsible for the collection 
of the terrorism-related content is analysed. Finally, the module that is responsible for 
the modelling of the human browsing behaviour is presented.  
 
3.1 Problem statement 
As discussed earlier, there is a need for tools for discovering and gathering terrorism-
related content both from the Surface and the Dark Web. Given though that servers 
hosting such content might use prevention measures to detect and ban bots (crawlers) 
that try to automatically collect this content, there is a need to evasively gather this con-
tent by mimicking human behaviour. 
Consider, for instance, the following scenario: LEAs have compiled an initial list of 
Surface and Dark Web URLs (seed set) with content related to terrorism and they need 
to crawl pages in order to collect relevant content and also discover pages with similar 
content within the same or different domain names. To this end, the proposed frame-
work can be applied to automatically collect this content without being identified as a 
botnet by using bots that simulate a humanlike browsing behaviour.  
The proposed botnet framework needs to collect as many terrorist-related URLs as pos-
sible in a given time, while mimicking a humanlike behaviour. Therefore, each bot 
needs to maintain a humanlike behaviour while at the same time it minimises the time 
between requests ( )noUrls  and maximises the number of hyperlinks followed each time 
( )time . To estimate these variables, we analyse the log data of (human) users accessing 
Web servers and browsing their URLs. 
Consider that the following can be determined using such log data: the set of all possi-
ble numbers of URLs that a human may follow from a Web page
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1 2{ , ,..., }nnoUrls noUrls noUrls  and the set of all possible times between successive re-
quests 1 2{ , ,..., }mtime time time . Our goal is to find the optimal value h  of a utility func-
tion ( , )h x y   that describes a possible humanlike behaviour where x is the number of 
URLs and y is the inter-request time, which will get the maximum inoUrls  (1 i n  ) 
and the minimum 
jtime (1 j m  ) from all the available values of the sets. 
 
 
{ }{ }
max min ( , )
timenoUrls
h h noUrls time   (1) 
 
It should be noted that, while the values of the utility function could be calculated and 
used, this is not the case in this project. Instead, a qualitative analysis of the function 
was performed to optimize our approach and compare it to the real human data. 
Furthermore, due to the fact that bots must (i) follow only the hyperlinks that are related 
to a domain of interest and (ii) exhibit a humanlike browsing behaviour, the trade-off 
between the humanlike behaviour and the effectiveness of the proposed botnet in gath-
ering content should be considered. This mainly occurs because the structure of the 
Web is not always suitable for exhaustive focused crawling and humanlike browsing 
behaviour. For example, several Web pages contain URLs related to the terrorism do-
main. The attempt of a bot to download all of the relevant URLs will result in revealing 
its non-human nature and as a consequence it will face denied access. Furthermore, it is 
not always feasible to automatically (i.e. by using classifiers) decide if a Web page is 
relevant to terrorism [4]. To this end, we try to maximise Precision (P) which represents 
the ratio of the discovered terrorism-related Web pages over all the collected Web pag-
es, while also maximising Recall (R), which represents the ratio of the collected terror-
ism-related Web pages over all the terrorism-related pages that exists in the sites of in-
terest (recall). Moreover, if we exploit the botnet architecture, we permit bots to com-
municate with each other and distribute the crawling load, thus achieving a higher re-
call. 
By maximising the ( )noUrls , minimising the ( )time , maximising both the P and R and 
still keeping a humanlike behaviour, our architecture results in developing an effective 
framework able to evasively collect terrorism-related content. 
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3.2 The botnet Framework 
An overview of the proposed framework for the focused crawling of content hosted 
both on the Surface and the Dark Web relevant to a domain of interest (and in particular 
to terrorism in this work) while employing a mechanism for evading detection by simu-
lating a humanlike behaviour is presented in Figure 9. Initially, the C&C server waits 
for a sufficient number of bots to be connected with it. For each bot, a list of the URLs 
to be crawled should manually be defined along with some codewords of relevance. 
These codewords may be pseudonyms used by terrorists. Since these keywords may 
change often, the procedure of adding these keywords is straightforward.  
The fetching (i.e. download) process starts, when a sufficient number of bots are con-
nected to the C&C server. For each connected bot the C&C server creates a FIFO list 
containing the URLs to be followed, as initialised by the Botmaster. Then, the C&C 
server retrieves the first URLs from all the lists and forwards them to the respective 
bots. Each bot downloads the content of the Web page the URL points to and sends the 
respective response to the server. A different fetching module is employed, based on the 
network type (i.e. Surface Web, Tor, I2P and Freenet). Next, the server extracts the new 
hyperlinks along with some of their textual features, evaluates them and, if they are rel-
evant to the domain of interest, it adds them to the respective FIFO list of the bot. The 
process is repeated until each FIFO list is emptied or a maximum number of iterations is 
reached. 
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Figure 9: Framework Architecture 
 
3.2.1 Botnet architecture 
The proposed botnet follows the client-server architecture, containing one Command 
and Control (C&C) Server and several bots. The C&C server performs all the computa-
tional logic and forwards the links to be downloaded to the responsible bots. Each bot 
may be installed on a different machine (using a different IP address), provided that the 
machines operate under the same firewall or the respective firewalls have the ports used 
by the botnet forwarded. The C&C server is the one deciding about the hyperlinks that 
should be followed, the number of the hyperlinks as well as the time elapsing between 
successive requests. The aforementioned decisions are based on the need of the bots for 
humanlike behaviour, presented in Section 3.4.  
Bots follow the design principle of the Internet, which dictates that all intermediate de-
vices should not possess high intelligence. To this end, bots are agents which receive a 
request to fetch a hyperlink, download its content and send a response to the C&C serv-
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er. The C&C server takes a decision about the hyperlinks to be fetched by taking into 
account the list of the URLs already fetched by all the bots engaged. The bots are also 
able to traverse both the Surface Web and several darknets of the Dark Web (i.e. TOR, 
I2P and Freenet) by forwarding each hyperlink to a specific service based on its net-
work type. 
 
3.2.2 Client-server communication 
Many protocols have been proposed for the communication of botnets. The most com-
mon ones are the IRC, the HTTP and the P2P [6], [9]. Botnet creators decide on which 
protocol to use depending mainly on their evasiveness and efficiency [40], [9]. For ex-
ample, the HTTP protocol does not usually create alerts since a lot of traffic in the net-
work is based on HTTP. In our case, the users are aware that the bot software is in-
stalled on their machines. This in turn entails that there is no need for using evasive pro-
tocols between the C&C server and the bots. To this end, we propose a simple pseudo-
communication protocol on top of TCP which introduces the least possible overhead. 
This protocol supports only the necessary commands for our framework including the 
download, stealth_download, login_and_download and exit commands. 
 
1) Download: downloads the content of a URL. The bot creates an HTTP GET request 
using a specific browser agent name, in order to better hide its nature, requesting the 
content of a URL. Due to the fact that the URL might not belong to the Surface Web 
(which means that special software must be used in order to access its content), the bot 
first identifies the network type of the URL and then forwards the HTTP request to the 
respective service which responds to the bot by sending the HTML content. 
2) Stealth download: downloads a page while hiding the IP address of the bot. Each bot 
supports a stealth mode using a pseudonymous (and not the real) IP address for submit-
ting requests. When fetching URLs from the Dark Web darknets supported, the stealth 
mode is enabled by default. When traversing the Surface Web, our bots exploit the Tor 
service which is capable of fetching URLs from the Surface Web and retrieve the re-
spective content. Specifically, when the stealth mode is on, each bot forwards the Sur-
face Web HTTP GET requests to the TOR service. This way, it is ensured that the real 
IP address of the bot is not disclosed regardless of the network type. 
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3) Login and download: downloads a page that requires authentication. Each bot can 
be initialized with some specific URLs that require a login functionality (i.e. submitting 
a username and a password) for accessing their content. When a bot encounters such a 
URL, it firsts submit an HTTP POST request to the server with the respective username 
and password and then receives the authentication cookie (if the username and/or pass-
word are not disclosed, they may be derived by applying techniques, such as wiretap-
ping, social engineering, etc.). This cookie is stored in the local directory of each bot. 
Next, for every new request, the bot retrieves the stored authentication cookie and im-
ports it to the new HTTP GET request header. This way, the bot can communicate and 
gather relevant data from servers hosting pages requiring authentication. 
4) Exit: closes the connection. When a bot receives the exit command, it closes the TCP 
socket and stops its execution. 
 
Due to the fact that there is a limitation to the maximum number of bytes that can be 
transferred in each TCP packet, the content is split into multiple smaller packets after 
being downloaded. When the whole document is transferred, an end command is issued 
by the bot defining the end of the Web page content. Please see the Appendix which 
provides an example of the communication between a C&C server and a bot using a 
network sniffer. 
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Figure 10: Inter-botnet communication protocol 
 
3.3 Focused crawling 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a focused crawler is a bot that traverses the Web and collects 
content related to a specific domain of interest. State-of-the-art approaches use classifi-
ers in order to decide whether to follow a link or not.  In our case, we follow the state-
of-the-art focused crawling techniques [2], [4] employing classifier-based approaches, 
enhanced by several functionalities so as to exhibit a humanlike browsing behaviour. 
 
3.3.1 URLs Repository 
The URLs repository keeps a record of all the URLs the crawler has visited, including 
information about the number of times each URL has been visited and the number of 
times the URLs from each domain have been visited. This information is used by other 
components of the framework, such as the component modelling the humanlike behav-
iour (Section 3.4). In addition, the URLs repository also keeps a record of the URLs 
scored as relevant to the domain of interest, but not fetched due to the crawler mimick-
ing of a humanlike behaviour. These URLs are stored in order to be used in a later stage 
as input for the botnet. 
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3.3.2 Fetcher 
Each bot is able to traverse both the Surface Web and several darknets of the Dark Web 
(i.e. Tor, I2P and Freenet), and fetch (i.e. download) the respective content. To this end, 
it is equipped with a fetcher module which receives a URL and then applies the suitable 
HTTP request in order to get the content of the respective Web page. Since each darknet 
needs specific software to be accessed, the fetcher component incorporates all necessary 
software and thus works as an interface between the bot and the respective networks.  
To this end, the fetcher module first identifies the network a URL belongs to and then 
forwards it to the specific sub-module so as to be downloaded. The Surface Web sub-
module directly downloads the page. The Tor, I2P and Freenet submodules use the re-
spective services in order to download the content of pages. In addition, when the 
stealth mode is used, Surface Web URLs can also be downloaded by using the Tor 
submodule (i.e. the Tor service). This means that instead of directly connecting to the 
server containing the URL, the bot uses a virtual circuit provided by the Tor network. 
This results in using a pseudonym IP address which cannot be (easily) correlated to the 
real one. This is useful when LEAs need to hide their real identity when connecting to 
these servers so that, even if they get identified as bots, their real IP address will not be 
black-marked. Moreover, such IP addresses change periodically and therefore future 
requests using a newly assigned IP address will be accepted by the servers. 
 
3.3.3 Hyperlink selection 
To estimate the relevance of a hyperlink to a specific domain (terrorism in this work), 
we employ state-of-the-art classification approaches based on textual evidence repre-
senting the local and global context of hyperlinks: (i) the anchor text and surrounding 
text of the hyperlinks in their parent page and (ii) the entire content of the parent page, 
respectively [17]. The problem is that sometimes the anchor and surrounding text of the 
hyperlink might not contain a lot of valuable information [4]. To this end, two classifi-
ers were implemented, one using the anchor and surrounding texts of the hyperlink as 
input and the other using the whole page. For the classifier that uses the anchor and sur-
rounding text of the hyperlinks, an example is shown in Figure11. In this case, a Web 
page with four hyperlinks is presented, “http://www.url1.com”, “http://www.url2.com”, 
“http://www.url3.com”, “http://www.url3.com”. The anchor texts of each one of them 
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are “Home”, “Picric acid”, “Nitroglycerine” and “motorcycles” respectively. Surround 
text exists only in the last hyperlink. This surround text is “Check out my web site on 
my other hobby:”.  In this case, this classifier will probably give a high score to the first 
three hyperlinks, since they include keywords of interest, while it will give a very low 
score to the last one, since it has no relevant keyword. 
 
 
Figure 11: Hyperlink selection example 
 
After some trial and error procedures, the text-based classification of the local (global) 
context was decided to be performed by using a supervised machine learning approach 
based on a Support Vector Machines (SVM) with a least square errors (LSE) loss func-
tion. By using the training set, first we extracted the keywords of interest. These key-
words of interest were extracted by finding the importance of each keyword to the 
whole document set. In order to do that, the .tf idf  (term frequency-inverse document 
frequency) information retrieval metric scheme was used. For the term frequency, the 
number of times each keyword appeared in all the documents tf  was calculated. For the 
inverse document frequency, the smooth inverse document frequency scheme 
log(1 )
t
N
n
  was used, where N is the number of all documents and tn  is the subset of 
the N that contains the term t. The final values of each keyword are calculated using the 
following formula: 
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The top-100 terms with the highest .tf idf  scores were selected to form all the available 
terms, which was also manually refined by domain experts (LEA representatives), re-
sulting in a lexicon of 110 terms. The finalised list of keywords is used for the feature 
selection for our SVM model.  
Our SVM model uses these keywords for its features. Specifically, for every new doc-
ument, it calculates the importance of all the lexicon terms appearing in the text, it cre-
ates vectors with a dimension equal to the lexicon size and it estimates the “importance 
value” of each keyword. This importance value is again calculated by using the .tf idf  
scheme, by using the log normalisation scheme 
,1 log( )t df  for the term frequency in 
order to deemphasize extreme values. So, each document is represented as a vector 
( , )i ix y , where ix is a vector containing all the values of the features, iy represents 
whether it is a positive or a negative sample and i is the feature index. Each one of these 
vectors is calculated using the following formula: 
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These vectors are provided to the SVM classifier, so as to decide to the optimal hyper-
line. In our case, we use the regularized loss support vector classification with least 
square errors (LSE) loss function which produces a probability of relevance instead of a 
binary classification. Next, for every new document provided to the SVM classifier, the 
( , )i ix y  vector is calculated, depending on whether these keywords appear to the ques-
tioned documents or not, and the SVM model produces a probability of whether they 
are relevant or not9 based on the following formula: 
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9 In this case, the iy  value is not known. In our case, where the weka software was used, iy is given the 
value of ‘?’ allowing the software to automatically decide if it is relevant of not. Weka software official 
site is http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/ 
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where w is the weight vector, C is the cost penalty, ε≥0 is a parameter to specify the 
sensitiveness of the loss.  
A score is produced for every new hyperlink, based on a fusion of the parent page’s 
score and the one extracted by the textual content appearing in vicinity of the hyperlinks 
within their parent page. Specifically, two classifiers are used, the first one utilizing the 
whole content of the parent Web page (which is already downloaded) and the second 
one using only the extracted textual features related to each specific hyperlink. Thus, 
two scores are calculated, one for the parent page and one for each hyperlink. This is 
because, in order to follow a humanlike behaviour, the content of a Web page is not 
fetched in order to decide whether it is relevant or not [4]. Thus, if a hyperlink is falsely 
followed based on its surrounding text, all new hyperlinks will get a lower score by the 
full-page classifier and thus they will not be followed. Furthermore, the score is re-
evaluated based on the initial codewords added to each bot. For the initial keywords of 
each bot, and since the number is unknown and the impact score of each keyword can-
not be calculated easily, a simple heuristic approach is used, in which the score of each 
keyword that appears in the textual features, extracted from the hyperlink, is added to 
the classifier’s score.  
The aforementioned fusion approach is presented below: 
 
 1 2 3_ _ ( _ )score w p score w h score w S k score        (5) 
 
where _p score  is the webpage based classifier’s output score, _h score  is the Link 
based classifier’s output score, S(x) is a sigmoid function and _k score  is the sum of all 
the scores of the keywords that are initialised to each bot, that are present in the sur-
rounding text of the hyperlinks,  
 
 
0 0
_ ( ) ( ))
N M
j kWord i
i j
k score f kWord I sentWord
 
    (6) 
 
where 1 2 3 1w w w   .Since _ 1p score  , _ 1h score   and the sigmoid that was used 
for _k score  also results in a score between 0 and 1, score  values are between 0 and 1. 
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For the _k score  calculation, ( )jf kWord  is the score of the keyword j as initialised to 
each bot and the ( )AI x  is an indicator function of whether x belongs to a set of values A 
and in our case whether a word from the surrounding or anchor text of the hyperlink 
( )isentWord  is contained to the bot’s initialised keyword set. Still, due to the fact that 
the keyword initialisation process (meant to be done by LEAs) is a manual one, even 
though a sigmoid function was used for balancing the scores, it is recommended that the 
values that will be used be relative to the values of the already evaluated keywords. 
 
3.4 Human browsing behaviour modelling 
Recent research [26] has revealed that bots that follow power law (Zipf-like) distribu-
tions to determine the number of pages to be browsed cannot be distinguished from hu-
man users. This indicates that in order to simulate a humanlike behaviour, the probabil-
ity of following a hyperlink that belongs to a server should be reduced depending on the 
number of hyperlinks of the same server that have already been followed. By reducing 
the score of a hyperlink based on the number of hyperlinks followed belonging to the 
same server, we can achieve a bot behaviour that follows such a distribution. 
To this end, the score of a hyperlink pointing to a page belonging to a specific server is 
reduced exponentially depending on the number of times that the hyperlinks of this 
server have already been followed. Thus, the score of each hyperlink is re-adapted by 
subtracting a factor that increases exponentially for every URL that belongs to the same 
server as follows: 
 
 1
r
score score c K      (7) 
 
where K is the number of URLs from that specific server that have been followed, r1 is 
the score reduction rate and c is a constant. The value of c is set based on the maximum 
number of URLs of the same server we allow a bot to follow irrespectively of their rel-
evance to the domain of interest. This can be easily calculated by computing the value 
of K for which 
rc K  value equals to 1.0. Actually, rc K  will never get a value of 1.0 
(not even near it) because the crawler will always find some hyperlinks that belong to 
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other servers with scores greater than those existing in the respective server and will 
leave (crawl away from) it. 
For a hyperlink to be accepted, the updated score should be greater than a threshold 2t , 
while at the same time the number of URLs that have been followed by the crawler so 
far has not reached the maximum allowed number; this maximum allowed number is 
estimated as follows. Furthermore, a Web page might contain many relevant hyperlinks. 
Following all these hyperlinks is likely to reveal that the agent is a bot. Given that the 
number of hyperlinks to be visited should follow a power law (Zipf-like) distribution, it 
can be concluded that the probability to follow a small number of hyperlinks in a given 
Web page should be higher than the probability to follow a large number of hyperlinks. 
To this end, we propose a simple normal-like distribution that identifies the maximum 
number of hyperlinks to be followed and meets the above requirement: 
 
 1max( ) ( ( ))noURLs abs g x   (8) 
 
where 1( )g x  is a normal distribution random variable. If there are less available URLs 
(due to the number of hyperlinks each page has and to the ones that have score greater 
than the threshold) then all the URLs whose score is greater than the threshold are fol-
lowed. 
Another major characteristic of human browsing modelling is the time between succes-
sive requests. State-of-the-art approaches propose the double Pareto distribution for the 
time elapsing between successive requests [41]:  
 
 
1( ) rf x r x     (9) 
 
where r is called reduction rate. We also take into account the content length of the 
downloaded site multiplied with a normal-like distribution function adding the probabil-
ity of whether the user has read the majority of the document, or part of it. For the 
weighting of the equations, the reading speed of users is taken into consideration. The 
final equation, which is the sum of the double Pareto distribution (equation 9) used by 
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the state-of-the-art approaches and the normal-like distribution proposed by our frame-
work is shown below: 
 
 2 1
4 2 5 2( ) ( _ ( ))
r
inittime w r u x w content size g x
         (10) 
   
where 2r   is the reduction rate, u(x) is a uniform distribution, 2 ( )g x  is a normal distri-
bution random variable and w3 and w4 are the double Pareto and content size weights. 
Since a server might block successive requests that happen in a short period of time, and 
there is a probability of our bots to do that, the time for every request that fails to re-
spond (e.g. 400s and 500s HTTP errors) will be updated by adding a random variable. 
 
 inittime time rand    (11) 
 
This mainly represents the human reaction to this kind of errors, which is the attempt to 
refresh the page. 
As a result of the above process, not all the hyperlinks of the Web sites of interest will 
be downloaded. In fact, while simulating a humanlike browsing behaviour, one cannot 
apply exhaustive crawling (at least in a short period of time). To this end, the hyperlinks 
that surpass the threshold value and were not downloaded will be stored and can be used 
as a new input to the crawling framework at a later stage. 
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4 Legal Framework 
The proposed methodology includes the use of a botnet for the collection of terrorism-
related content both from the Surface and the Dark Web. Since the targeted sites are 
meant to be run by terrorists and, most probably, bot detection techniques will have 
been installed, we have enhanced our approach by introducing techniques, such as the 
humanlike behaviour modelling and the stealth download, in order to be able to bypass 
these protection techniques. 
As it is understood the proposed botnet does not follow the general regulations and eth-
ics that apply to crawlers, since it does not take the preferences of the site of interest re-
garding crawling into account (which can also be mentioned in the robots.txt file con-
tained in each server). Thus, our approach can be applied only under specific legal and 
ethical frameworks in specific countries. 
To this end, this kind of tools must only be used by LEAs and only when the respective 
regulations are followed (e.g. USA Patriot Act, EU counter-terrorism policy, etc). These 
legislations outline the need of such tools for LEAs in order to efficiently attack terror-
ism. Of course, other legislations about privacy and protection of personal data must 
also be followed, and each LEA that uses this kind of tools must find the balance (pre-
sented in the respective legislation) between terrorism mitigation and protection of hu-
man rights so as to only use these tools when necessary. 
For our testing purposes, we used Web servers that allow the crawling procedure and, 
when needed, we also implemented our own servers for some specific procedures, like 
the automatic bot login/authentication. Furthermore, we did not keep any content that 
was collected apart from the respective URLs. This is mainly for protection of potential 
sensitive data that these URLs might contain. 
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5 Experiments 
To assess the effectiveness of the proposed focused botnet framework in terms of dis-
covering content relevant to the terrorism domain, as well as how well it simulates a 
humanlike behaviour, a series of experiments are performed using a set of seed URLs 
selected in cooperation with LEAs and domain experts and one public dataset for mod-
elling the human browsing behaviour. This section describes the evaluation methodolo-
gy (Section 5.1) and the experimental set-up (Section 5.2), and then presents the results 
of the experiments (Section 5.3). 
 
5.1 Evaluation methodology 
The purpose of the proposed botnet framework is the discovery and collection of terror-
ism-related content while exhibiting humanlike browsing characteristics. Therefore, we 
evaluate (i) the effectiveness of the botnet framework with respect to the relevance of 
the URLs selected by the bots to the terrorism domain and (ii) the humanlike browsing 
behaviour of the crawler. 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the crawler, precision and recall are employed. Specifi-
cally, precision is calculated as the percentage of relevant URLs among all collected 
URLs, while recall is calculated as the percentage of relevant URLs retrieved in com-
parison with all relevant URLs available when starting crawling from the seed set and 
following all encountered hyperlinks. Starting from the seed set, a dataset is created by 
following all hyperlinks included in the content of these pages. This process is repeated 
until a specific time. The proposed botnet that simulates a humanlike behaviour is com-
pared against a single bot that uses a non-humanlike and a humanlike behaviour. 
The collected URLs were annotated as either relevant or non-relevant to terrorism on a 
binary scale. The URLs that were annotated as relevant (positive) to terrorism contained 
information like tutorials on the construction of bombs or weapons, terrorism propagan-
da and radicalisation and therefore could be useful to terrorists. All other URLs were 
annotated as non-relevant (negative). 
To evaluate the humanlike browsing behaviour of the framework, two factors were 
used: the number of the crawler’s requests to a specific server [27] and the time between 
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successive requests [41]. The evaluation is based on the EPA HTTP10  public dataset 
which contains a day’s worth of all HTTP requests to the EPA WWW server located at 
Research Triangle Park, North California. 
 
5.2 Experimental Setup 
Since the goal of this paper is to assess whether the crawler's behaviour is adequately 
humanlike, we compared a non-humanlike bot (i.e. a bot that uses state-of-the-art crawl-
ing techniques), a humanlike bot (i.e. a bot that uses our proposed humanlike behaviour) 
and a humanlike botnet, consisting of 3 humanlike bots. Furthermore, for our experi-
ments, 3 Surface Web, 1 TOR, 1 I2P and 1 Freenet URLs related to terrorism were 
used. These were provided by LEAs and domain experts. The number of seed URLs 
was chosen to be small, because of the fact that for the evaluation of the outcomes, each 
new discovered URL must be manually annotated as relevant or not. The URLs are not 
provided in order to avoid the potential distribution of private/sensitive information but 
are available upon request. 3 bots were decided to be used for the botnet, because of the 
small number of seed set URLs and the limited resources regarding the different IPs and 
virtual environments. For the experiments and in case of the botnet, the first bot was 
initialised with the Surface Web URL#1, the Surface Web URL#2 and the Freenet 
URL. The second bot was initialised with the Surface URL#2, the Surface Web URL#3 
and the TOR URL. The third bot was initialised with the Surface Web URL#3, the Sur-
face Web URL#1 and the I2P URL. This was mainly done because of the fact that, in 
our case, the Surface Web URLs contained a lot of relevant hyperlinks. If we only as-
signed one bot per URL then the recall would be rather small due to the fact that each 
bot follows a humanlike browsing behaviour, picking only a subpart of all the relevant 
hyperlinks. 
Regarding the classifiers, 20 positive and 20 negative Web pages collected by domain 
experts and LEAs’ representatives were used for their training. The top-100 terms with 
the highest .tf idf   scores were selected to form the lexicon, which was also manually 
refined by domain experts (LEA representatives), resulting in a lexicon of 110 terms. 
                                                 
10 http://ita.ee.lbl.gov/html/contrib/EPA-HTTP.html 
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The effectiveness of the proposed botnet was evaluated (i) at specific times (15, 30, and 
45 minutes after the start of the crawling) and (ii) once a specific number of URLs has 
been collected (50, 100 and 150 URLs). In the first stage of the first case, i.e. 15 
minutes into the experiment, both precision and recall of the humanlike botnet frame-
work were calculated and they were compared with a humanlike bot and a non-
humanlike behaviour of bot of the framework. In the second and the third stage of the 
first case, i.e. 30 and 45 minutes into the experiment, only the precision of botnet was 
calculated, since both the number of URLs collected by the botnet, the humanlike bot 
and the non-humanlike bot and the number of URLs rejected (required for estimating 
recall) increased exponentially rendering their manual assessment a very time-
consuming process. In the second case, the precision of the humanlike botnet was com-
pared against that of a humanlike bot and a non-humanlike bot. 
Some preliminary experiments were then performed first for setting the values of the 
parameters (Table 1) and functions (Table 2) of equations 4-11 of our framework. 
 
Table 1: Values of variables used in the experiments 
Variable Value Variable Value 
C 1.0 ε 0.001 
1w  
0.3 
2w  
0.7 
3w  
0.0 
4w  
10000 
5w  
0.01 
1r  
1.3 
2r  
1.1 t1, t2 0.6 
 
 
Table 2: Functions used in the experiments 
Function Value 
S(t) 
(Sigmoid function) 
1
1 te  
u(x) 
0 ~ 100 
(uniform distribution) 
g1(x) 
Gaussian distribution 
with mean = 10 and SD=8 
g2(x) 
Gaussian distribution 
with mean = 0 and SD=7 
rand() 
1 ~ 5 second 
(uniform distribution) 
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5.3 Evaluation Results 
Table 3 shows the precision and, when applicable, the recall of the first 3 evaluation 
stages at 15, 30 and 45 minutes. The humanlike approach results in the collection of 
fewer URLs (since there are constraints in the time between successive requests), but 
achieves higher percentages of relevant URLs (precision). This is expected, since the 
humanlike approach selects only a subset of the URLs estimated as relevant, and specif-
ically the ones with the highest scores. On the other hand, the humanlike botnet ap-
proach, which combines the results of the bots, outcomes an adequate recall in compari-
son with the non-humanlike approach. Moreover, as also expected, precision decreases 
over time for all approaches, because the crawler is getting away from the initial rele-
vant URLs, and may encounter non relevant ones.  
 
Table 3: Focused crawling for humanlike botnet, humanlike bot and non-humanlike bot behav-
iour at specific time periods 
 
Non-
humanlike 
bot 
Humanlike bot Humanlike botnet 
15 min 15 min 30 min 45 min 15 min 30 min 45 min 
Total  
pages  
retrieved 
67 32 64 105 105 207 306 
True  
positives 
43 24 45 63 70 120 150 
False 
positives 
24 8 19 42 35 87 156 
Total  
pages  
rejected 
216 21 1503 2138 209 6992 11003 
True 
negatives 
170 0 - - 120 - - 
False 
negatives 
46 21 - - 89 - - 
Precision 64% 75% 70% 60% 67% 58% 49% 
Recall 48% 21% - - 44% - - 
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As the number of URLs collected at specific time marks greatly differs between the 
humanlike botnet and the humanlike and the non-humanlike bots, we also examine the 
effectiveness of the aforementioned approaches for the same number of collected URLs. 
The precision of the humanlike botnet and the humanlike and non-humanlike bots for 
the same number of collected URLs is presented in Table 4. In all three cases, the preci-
sion decreases when the number of URLs increases, as the crawlers navigate away from 
their initial seed set of highly relevant URLs. The humanlike approach especially faces 
a greater decrease, as it is configured to not exhaustively follow all hyperlinks from a 
particular server, thus missing some URLs from servers that host a lot of terrorism-
related content. The humanlike botnet approach results in precision that is near the hu-
manlike bot, but with less decrement over number of collected URLs, since it exploits 
the humanlike URLs selective approach, but at the same time has higher recall thus col-
lecting more relevant results of the pages of interest. 
 
Table 4: Focused crawling for humanlike and non-humanlike behaviour at specific number of 
collected URLs 
 
Non-humanlike 
bot 
Humanlike bot Humanlike botnet 
#URLs 50 100 150 50 100 150 50 100 150 
Total pages  
retrieved 
50 100 150 50 100 150 50 100 150 
True positives 33 58 84 38 60 83 37 66 92 
False positive 17 42 16 12 40 67 13 34 58 
Precision 66% 58% 56% 76% 60% 55% 74% 66% 61% 
 
 
Furthermore, we evaluated the humanlike behaviour of our botnet at the 20-hour mark. 
To this end, a power law estimation function was used to evaluate how close our model 
of human behaviour (both in a focused crawling and in a general crawling case) is to 
real human behaviour as this is reflected in the server logs of human usage in the EPA 
dataset. Table 5 presents these results: (i) an estimated function of the number of re-
quests per server (x) in correlation with the number of users that applied this number of 
requests (y) and (ii) the R-squared coefficient that indicates the goodness of fit to the 
power law distribution. 
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As we can see, data in the EPA dataset closely follow a power law distribution. The fo-
cused crawling approaches also resemble power law distributions, with the non-
humanlike approach deviating more from it than the humanlike approach. When con-
sidering the standard (non-focused) crawling, the non-humanlike approach is closer to 
power law than the humanlike approach. This is due to the fact that the (non-humanlike) 
crawling simply follows all hyperlinks extracted from the encountered Web pages 
which follow a power law distribution. It is worth mentioning the fact that bots of the 
botnet present a different behaviour even though initialised with the same variables. 
This is mainly because our approach of the humanlike behaviour is strongly based on 
the randomness, which results in such deviations in behaviour between the bots. This 
allows for a more evasive approach compared to the state-of-the-art detection tech-
niques which try to classify bots under the same category, separating them the behav-
iour that a human would have. 
 
Table 5: Power law estimation function for 20 hours 
Servers/Bots 
Power-law estimation 
function 
R-squared coefficient11 
EPA 1.652967.17y x  0.8812 
Focused crawling 
(humanlike) 
0.75222.932y x  0.6960 
Focused crawling 0.8127.541y x  0.6895 
Crawling 
(humanlike) 
0.74825.205y x  0.6362 
Crawling 0.94571.006y x  0.6953 
Focused crawling 
(humanlike) – Bot 1 
0.77924.18y x  0.7063 
Focused crawling 
(humanlike) – Bot 2 
0.8635.04y x  0.7647 
Focused crawling 
(humanlike) – Bot 3 
0.89531.312y x  0.7569 
 
A graphical representation of the above is shown in Figure 12. 
 
                                                 
11   The R-squared coefficient is calculated by 
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Figure 12: Frequency of requests 
 
A more straightforward way to evaluate how humanlike the frequency of requests in our 
approach seems is to use a power law distribution that is congruent with state-of-the-art 
approaches and compare it directly with one of our humanlike bots. Figure 13 shows 
this comparison. 
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Figure 13: Frequency of requests - power law curve vs humanlike botnet 
 
Finally, the difference in the time between successive requests of a human browsing be-
haviour, the proposed humanlike focused crawler one and the bots of our proposed bot-
net was calculated. To this end, we compared our crawler’s time between successive 
requests with the one of the most active user of the EPA dataset (Figure 14). In all cas-
es, the time between successive requests follow a distribution that is reminiscent of a 
double Pareto one, as state-of-the-art approaches have shown [30]. Due to the fact that 
our bots’ time between successive requests also depends on the content size of the page, 
each bot presents a different distribution, all near the double Pareto one. Therefore, our 
approach also presents a humanlike behaviour concerning the time between successive 
requests, which results in better masking its bot nature. 
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Figure 14: Time between requests 
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6 Conclusions 
This work proposed a botnet for crawling content related to a domain of interest both on 
the Surface and the Dark Web by trying to mimic human browsing behaviour. Follow-
ing state-of-the-art approaches for human browsing behaviour modelling, each bot 
adapts the number of requests to each server and the time between successive requests 
by following probability distributions in order to hide its bot nature. In our work we also 
took into account the content of each Web page and its size in order to provide a more 
humanlike behaviour. Specifically, the classifiers that were used in each bot resulted in 
the tendency of each bot to follow Web pages related to a domain of interest which was, 
in our case, terrorism.  
The effectiveness of the framework was evaluated comparing the behaviour of our bots 
with the behaviour of users interacting with EPA server. The results have shown that 
bots can effectively mimic human browsing behaviour regarding the hyperlinks that are 
followed and the time interval between requests. This framework was also tested for its 
effectiveness regarding the collection of terrorism-related content. In this case, and 
since no public dataset exists, a dataset was created in cooperation with LEAs partici-
pating in the HOMER project to evaluate our botnet. As shown in the results, the botnet 
can be used for the effective collection of terrorism-related content. 
The purpose of this framework is to be used by LEAs in order to discover and collect 
content related to a domain of interest and, in our case, to the terrorist domain. Since 
servers that contain this content might block bots or crawlers that automate the process 
of collecting this content, it is important for the proposed framework to be able to trick 
the servers by presenting a humanlike behaviour. The collection of this content can be 
analysed and used by LEAs for the fight against terrorism. Of course, since these tools 
might use methodologies that might be considered unethical or even illegal in some 
countries, it is important that the respective legislation is followed when these tools are 
used (e.g. USA Patriot Act, EU counter-terrorism policy, etc). 
Future work includes the solution of scalability problems of the existing architecture, by 
creating a new one that combines the client-server and the P2P architectures in a way 
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that a central control will be available in a hierarchical tree structured model enabling 
the communication of a greater number of bots. For this architecture, new methods will 
also be implemented in order to (i) increase its stability and recovery when bots leave or 
enter the network and (ii) enable the multiple parallel crawlings starting from different 
points in time. Furthermore, a new protocol will be proposed that extends the evasive 
behaviour inside the botnet. This is really important when bots belonging to this botnet 
are meant to be installed to machines in a network that does not allow it. Moreover, new 
machine learning methodologies will be implemented for the automatic adjustment of 
the weights that are used by the bots. Finally, the proposed botnet will be further tested 
to other domains of interest to LEAs (e.g. human trafficking, drugs, child pornography), 
and the finalised version will include all these functionalities so as to function as a more 
holistic tool for LEAs. 
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Appendix A – Communication 
protocol 
This section will present how the inter-botnet communication protocol works. The 
packets that were exchanged between the bots and the C&C server were captured using 
Wireshark, although any sniffer would suffice for the demonstration. 
For our example we have a C&C server, whose IP address is 160.40.50.210 and a client 
bot, whose IP address is the 160.40.48.171. The C&C server is configured to initiate the 
download process after one bot has established a connection and it only had one URL as 
input. 
After the establishment of the connection, the client receives the requested URL and 
responds back the content of the URL page. The response packet is shown in Figure 15.  
 
 
Figure 15: Response of the Bot after the C&C server’s request. 
 
Usually, the response of a client is larger than the maximum allowed size of a TCP 
packet, as it consists of the content of a webpage. For this reason, the information is 
split among packets. When all packets are received, an end command is issued by the 
client as shown in Figure 16.  
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Figure 16: END command signifies the end of Web page content 
 
 
Finally, the same procedure is repeated when the C&C server issues an exit command. 
In this case, the bot first responds with the message “Bot exiting” (Figure 17) followed 
by the END command, and then both the C&C server and the Bot close the TCP socket 
(Figure 18). 
 
 
Figure 17: Bot response to the exit command 
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Figure 18: END command signifies the end of the connection 
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Appendix B – Code and Tools 
All the code for this thesis was written in java, with the use of Eclipse IDE12 . The code 
is comprised of two separate java projects, one for the server and one for the clients. 
The server project is located at the central computer, and is responsible for the bots’ co-
ordination. The client project is exported as a jar file and is distributed to all the com-
puters used as bots.  
To allow the seamless crawling of both the Surface and the Dark Web, the client project 
provides interfaces for the Tor, I2P and Freenet services. These services are necessary 
to access content included in these networks. Provided that client computers have in-
stalled all these services, the botnet is able to download content from both the Surface 
Web and the Tor, I2P and Freenet darknets. 
Regarding the classification process, the WEKA library was used, which is an open 
source library for machine learning that bundles several techniques from Support Vector 
Machines. 
The communication protocol between the client and the server was written in java, 
based on the library responsible for the creation of TCP/IP sockets (java.net). 
The evaluation of the framework was performed on the server side. To do that, the serv-
er project includes java functions for the automatic calculation of the evaluation metrics 
and export mechanisms that allow the use of its output by Microsoft Excel for the crea-
tion of graphs that present the framework’s behaviour. 
Finally, Microsoft Visio was used to present the framework’s architecture in a graph. 
                                                 
12 https://eclipse.org/. The Eclipse project. 
